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EU ACCESSION CRITERIA-
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Abstract: This paper is a case study of the Maltese macroeconomic 
situation, within the context ofMalta's accession negotiations with 
the European Union. The Maastricht Convergence Criteria and 
the Stability and Growth Pact relate to the Economic and Mon-
etary Union, but are considered as benchmarks for member states, 
whether these form part of the EMU or not. Within this framework 
this article assesses Malta's economic situation vis-a-vis conver-
gence with the European Union, taking into account both nominal 
and real convergence. The Maastricht convergence criteria are 
used for nominal convergence while Okun's discomfort index and 
the EMU indicator devised by Gros and Thygesen are used to 
analyse real convergence. 
Introduction 
This paper discusses the macroeconomic dimension of the criteria adopted 
by the European Union in accession negotiations with prospective 
applicant countries, with particular reference to the negotiations cur-
rently under way between Malta and the EU. Malta formally started 
accession negotiations in mid-February 2000 and the Government is 
confident that the country will be included in the next enlargement of the 
European Union. 
The macroeconomic dimensions of the Copenhagen official accession 
criteria are spelled out in the Maastricht Convergence Criteria and the 
Stability and Growth Pact. While these may be viewed as strictly relating 
to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) issues rather than to EU 
membership directly, the European Commission stated that, 
"As membership of the EU includes acceptance of the global 
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goal of EMU, the con vergence criteria will have to be fulfilled 
by Malta, although not necessarily upon accession. They 
remain key points of reference for stability oriented macro-
economic policies, and must in time be fulfilled by Member 
States on a permanent basis." (European Commission 1999, 
Section 3.6) 
Furthermore, Begg et al observe that "in whatever wave entry takes 
place, EMU entrants will still have to observe the Maastricht criteria" 
(Begg et al., 1997:68-69). 
In view of these considerations, this paper assesses Malta's standing in 
relation to the M<1astricht convergence criteria and the Stability and 
Growth Pact. In discussing effective economic and monetary integration 
Lahmidi and Patterson (1998) distinguish between nominal convergence 
(referring to the official Maastricht criteria) and real economic conver-
gence (relating to real GDP growth, unemployment rate and GDP per 
capita). The discussion is here extended beyond nominal convergence 
issues to encompass considerations of real economic convergence, which 
may at the end of the day prove to be just as important to Malta's eventual 
integration with the EU economy. 
The Maastricht Criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact 
An exposition of the role of the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and 
Growth Pact, within the recent developments regarding economic and 
monetary integration within the EU, sheds light on Malta's present 
position vis-a-vis the macroeconomic accession criteria. 
"[A]s real economic integration (through trade and move-
ments of resources) proceeded, monetary integration be-
came increasingly desirable." (Grahl, 1997:109) 
With the single market in motion, a single currency appeared the next 
logical step in the process. The Delors Report of 1989 proposed a three 
stage process for economic and monetary union. It stressed the need for 
greater coordination of economic policies, the financing of national 
budgets and the need for an independent institution that would be 
responsible for the Union's monetary policy. In order to qualify for the 
third stage, envisaged for 1st January 1999, member states had to show 
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a high degree of durable convergence as .measured by certain criteria 
entrenched in the Treaty. Member states were required to comply with 
·the four convergence criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty and the 
relevant protocol (No.6), Article109j(1). The four areas are: price stabil-
ity; government finances; exchange rates; and long term interest rates. 
Price stability is achieved by a convergence of the inflation rate, which 
much not be more than 1.5% higher than the average of the three lowest 
inflation rates in the European Monetary System (EMS). In 1997, the 
three countries were France, Ireland and Austria, whose average stood 
at 1.2%. Therefore, the limit of the inflation rate for the other countries 
was set at 2. 7%. In 1999, this limit decreased to 1.3% since negative 
inflation was registered by one of the best performing countries. Price 
stability is assessed using harmonized price indices for the preceding 
twelve months. 
Convergence in Government finances has two facets: the budget deficit 
and government debt, both as a ratio to GDP. Government budgetary 
deficit should not exceed 3% of GDP. If it does, it should be declining 
continuously and reaching the 3% level or it "should be exceptional and 
temporary and remain close to the reference value" [Art.104c(a)]. Gov-
ernment debt should not exceed 60% of the GDP. If this is not the case, 
it should "diminish sufficiently and approach the reference value (60%) 
at a satisfactory pace" [Art.104c(b)]. 
For exchange rate convergence, a country must have participated in the 
European Monetary System (ERM2) for the previous two years without 
having devalued its currency against the currency of any other member 
state. 
Long-term interest rates must not exceed by more than 2% the average 
of the three best-performers of the price stability measure. The yield on 
government bonds with a maturity of 10 years is used as a measure, 
except in the case of Greece where a maturity period of 5 years is used. 
In 1997 the average nominal long-term interest rate of France, Ireland 
and Austria, was 5.8%. Therefore, the upper limit was set at 7.8%. In 
1999, this limit decreased to 7.0%. According to the Treaty, while the 
inflation rate shows price stability convergence, long-term interest rates 
show the durability of such convergence. 
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Furthermore, in its assessments, the Commission also takes account of 
the integration of the local market with the EU markets, the situation 
and the development of the balances of payments on the current account, 
and the development of the unit labour costs and other price indices. 
Who Qualified? 
It is interesting to note the difference in the assessments between the 
1996 and the 1997 convergence reports and how some member states 
were "allowed" to qualify through an abrogation. Furthermore, some 
countries were "creative" in how they managed to qualify. 
The 1996 converg~nce report for the member states was not satisfactory. 
Spain, Greece, Italy, Portugal and the UK had inflation rates above the 
reference value. Only three member states (Denmark, Ireland and 
Luxembourg) qualified under the 3% govern1nent deficit/GDP ratio. 
Only three countries (France, Luxembourg and the UK) were below the 
60% government debt/GDP ratio. Nine countries qualified under the 
exchange rate criterion, with Greece, Italy, Sweden and the UK, actually 
being out of the ERM2. Eleven countries qualified under the interest rate 
criterion. 
The 1997 convergence report was promising and showed the countries' 
commitment to form part of the European monetary union. Commitment 
gave the countries political credibility because of their efforts to adjust 
"within a rules-based macroeconomic framework ... embedded in EMU" 
(Jones et al, 1998:23). The euro was launched with eleven countries, with 
Denmark and the UK opting out of the EMU, Sweden not qualifying 
because it did not form part of the ERM2 and Greece not qualifying under 
any of the four criteria. However, in April2000, Greece was accepted and 
will join the Eurozone in January 2001. 
Some of the EU countries were "highly creative" to achieve the thresholds 
that apply to the convergence criteria (Seidel, 1998:1). For example, the 
French government assumed the future pensions obligations of the 
former telephone company employees, the Telecom, and in so doing 
accepted a lump sum of about eleven billion deutschemarks from the 
company. In order to raise additional revenue, Italy devised a new tax 
system. The German government rescheduled the repayments ofunifi-
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cation debts. These examples show that financial stretching and post-
ponement of payments helped countries meet the criteria. An article by 
·the Princeton Economic Institute (1997:1) suggested that "without 'cook-
ing' the books, Germany would fail to meet its own Maastricht budget 
deficit criteria." There was also a possibility that the "tough convergence 
criteria ... may be relaxed ... as the deadline for EMU approaches" (Frank, 
1992:17). 
The Stability and Growth Pact 
The Stability and Growth Pact is a means of exerting financial discipline 
on governments once the single currency was launched further to the 
excessive deficit criterion laid out in the Maastricht Treaty. 
"The credibility of the (ECB's) monetary policy is further 
supported by the budgetary provisions of the Treaty, which 
oblige Member States to avoid excessive budget deficits. The 
Stability and Growth Pact clearly defines the exceptional 
circumstances under which excessive deficits are allowed". 
(Duisenberg, 1997:2) 
The Stability Pact defines when a deficit can be allowed and when it 
demands sanctions and fines. When the deficit exceeds 3% and the Ecofin 
Council rules that the case is not an exceptional one, the country in 
question would have to deposit with the ECB the amount of0.2% of the 
GDP plus 10% of the percentage points by which the 3% limit has been 
exceeded. The maximum deposit is 0.5% of GDP, which is transformed 
into a fine if the deficit is not cut within two years. Since the Maastricht 
Treaty also contains a "no-bail-out clause", the country would have to 
adopt appropriate budget policies because there would be no help 
forthcoming from the other member states or the ECB. Therefore, 
countries will need a high degree of credibility to be able to raise 
resources from financial markets. Germany even proposed that govern-
ments reduce the budget deficit to 1% ofGDP in times of normal economic 
growth so as to be able to handle a 3% deficit in recessions (Association 
for the Monetary Union of Europe, 1998:2). 
The non-financing of fiscal deficits, the no-bail-out clause and the 
excessive deficits prohibition are regulatory constraints so that price 
stability is not undermined (Pelkmans, 1997:304-305). Applicant coun-
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tries must also adhere to these restrictions even if they do not join the 
EMU upon accession. · 
The effectiveness of the Growth and Stability Pact at fostering fiscal 
discipline in EMU-member countries has been put to doubt. For instance, 
in an interview with the International Herald Tribune in November 
1998, Massimo D'Alema (then Prime Minister of Italy) said that 
"governments should be free to 'interpret' the Stability and Growth Pact" 
(Cable News Network Inc., 1998). 
Thus, the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty and the Growth and 
Stability Pact are intended to ensure an adequate degree of convergence 
between countries participating in the single European currency. Their 
interpretation and implementation may however fall somewhat short of 
the original intents, especially with regard to fiscal discipline. We now 
turn to analyse some implications of these developments for Malta's 
membership bid within the European Union. 
The Maltese Macroeconomic Situation 
Malta is a small, open economy with virtually no natural resources save 
for its human capital, a favourable climate, its sea and deep harbours. Its 
labour force stands at just under 150,000. The value of its imports are 
close to that of its GDP and exports typically fall short of imports by 
around 5%. Its economy depends on tourism and an assembly-type 
manufacturing. Within these sectors, there is strong concentration on a 
few core activities that is rendered necessary by the small scale of the 
economy. Socio-political motivations partly embedded in a colonial his-
tory have led the public sector to occupy a substantial role in economic 
activity. The public sector, comprising general government and public 
entities, account for almost 40% of employment in Malta. The economy's 
dependence on the government extends to the provision of many essen-
tial services such as housing, health and education, and to a generous 
welfare system whose sustainability is being questioned in view of 
population ageing. 
Almost since its inception in the early seventies, the exchange rate of the 
Maltese lira has been detennined by means of a peg to a basket of stable, 
low-inflation currencies. This has provided a nominal anchor for the 
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Maltese economy, linking domestic inflation to the average of the coun-
tries whose currencies compose the basket. Developments in the balance 
, of payments and consequent movements in official external reserves 
thus bear the brunt of changes in economic conditions, and ultimately 
indicate the sustainability or otherwise of a given set of economic policies. 
Domestic interest rates would in these circumstances be expected to 
reflect interest rates on the currencies composing the Maltese lira peg 
adjusted by a risk premium typically applicable to a small, open economy. 
In practice, this link was for a number of years severed by means of 
exchange controls, which allowed domestic interest rates to be kept at 
artificially low levels by means of direct regulation. These restrictions 
were for a period of time complmnented by controls on imports. It is 
suspected that these controls were only partially successful in restrain-
ing the outflow of capital from the country. 
The macro-economic policy orientation has seen some important changes 
in recent years. The exchange rate peg remained an unchanged feature 
of economic policy, but controls on interest rates were virtually com-
pletely removed at the same time that the rudiments for a market-
oriented monetary policy were laid down within the context of developing 
a financial infrastructure. At the same time, controls on imports were 
completely removed, while those on capital flows are being lifted gradu-
ally. These measures are in line with enhancing the efficiency of the 
domestic money and capital markets and bringing them closer to the 
requirements of EU membership. 
At the sarne time, however, the fiscal deficit expanded substantially, 
creating a twin deficit on the external current account, which is financed 
by capital inflows or through a reduction in the country's official reserves. 
It is generally recognised that in a small, open economy as Malta, the 
exchange rate peg cannot be sustained durably in the face of these 
deficits. The symptoms of this unsustainability would be an excessively 
high level of interest rates, reflecting the risk of a Maltese lira devalua-
tion, or outright strong outflows of capital motivated by the same reason. 
The main targets of macroeconomic policy in Malta have been set out in 
the Budget Speech for 1998. These in part reflect the provisions of the 
Maastricht criteria, but add further dimensions peculiar to the economic 
situation of the country. The main targets indicated there include: 
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0 A 3% ceiling to the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio. This target was in 
practice missed by a wide margin, as the deficit reached 12% of GDP 
by 1998. This has led government to redraw a plan to reduce the deficit 
to between 3% and 4% ofGDP by 2004. 
0 Inflation to be maintained at between 2% and 3%. This target was 
achieved largely thanks to the currency peg and the general trend 
decline in inflation in Malta's main trading partner countries. 
o The unemployment rate to be maintained at under 4% and the share 
of public sector employment to drop to between 25% and 30%. Neither 
of these targets has been achieved in practice, with unemployment 
hovering around 5% and the share of public sector employment just 
under 40%. 
• The supply-side economic fundamentals to be improved by enhancing 
the role of markets and the availability and productivity of resources. 
Amongst other things, productivity growth was to become the main 
benchmark for wage increases. However, there still does not exist an 
index to measure productivity in Malta. Furthermore, Malta has 
some way to go to bring its competitiveness to the standards required 
by the European Single Market, as the avis on Malta's application for 
membership indicates. 
The Maltese Economy and Nominal EMU Convergence 
It is against this backdrop that Malta aspires to become a full member of 
the European Union. Even though the aspiring new member states are 
not likely to be in a position to join the EMU area upon accession, 
"they must conform to the rules governing prospective 
members of the EMU which means granting independence 
to their central banks, coordination of economic policies, 
adherence to the relevant parts of the Stability and Growth 
Pact and abandoning any direct central bank financing of 
public sector deficits." (European Commission, 1998:9) 
It is further considered that the window-dressing and special arrange-
ments made by larger "veteran" members of the European Union to 
qualify for EMU will not be applicable to a new entrant wit4 a potentially 
more vulnerable and riskier economic set-up. It is thus interesting to 
compare Malta's economic performance with that required by the EMU 
convergence criteria, subject to the qualifications that the economy is 
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Table 1 
Maastricht Convergence Criteria Applied to Malta 
1980-1999 
Year Inflation Govt. Govt. Interest LrnJECU 
Rate Budget Debt Rate (Euro) 
Deficit/ Exchange 
Surplus Rate 
1980 15.76 0.06 24.6 6.250 2.0821 
1981 11.50 2.19 27.1 6.250 2.3169 
1982 5.80 -1.69 31.5 6.375 2.4740 
1983 -0.87 -2.25 30.0 6.375 2.5956 
1984 -0.44 -2.42 28.9 6.500 2.7526 
1985 -0.24 -2.22 28.1 6.500 2.8057 
1986 2.00 -3.08 25.5 6.500 2.5969 
1987 0.42 -7.75 26.1 6.500 2.5107 
1988 0.95 -0.87 27.5 6.500 2.5565 
1989 0.86 -5.26 28.1 6.750 2.6048 
1990 2.98 -6.01 31.1 7.000 2.4733 
1991 2.54 -5.59 29.7 7.750 2.4979 
1992 1.64 -3.41 28.5 7.750 2.4287 
1993 4.14 -3.37 32.9 7.750 2.2347 
1994 4.13 -4.32 33.5 7.750 2.2296 
1995 3.98 -3.10 35.9 7.750 2.1669 
1996 2.49 -9.00 41.9 7.500 2.1852 
1997 3.27 -9.90 52.6 7.620 2.2921 
Reference 
Value 1997 2.7% -3% 60% 7.8% ERM2 
1998 2.43 -11.10 56.2 6.86 2.2640 
1999 2.13 -8.60 54.0 6.14 2.4114 
Reference 
Value 1999 1.3% -3% 60% 7.0% ERM2 
Source: Adapted from various issues (1980-1988) of the Quarterly Review and the Annual 
Report (Central Bank of Malta) and National Accounts of the Maltese Islands (Central 
Office of Statistics) 
still undergoing fundamental restructuring towards EU membership 
which could have an important impact on macroeconomic developments. 
The data in Table 1 shows Malta's position vis-a-vis all the criteria save 
for the exchange rate. The latter is not considered because the Maltese 
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lira remained relatively stable against European currencies due to the: 
heavy weight of these currencies in the basket. Thus, the exchange ratei 
for the Maltese lira cannot be regarded as a fair market-based test of) 
convergence. · 
Table 1 indicates that at present, Malta qualifies for EMU convergence! 
under the interest rate and government debt/GDP ratio criteria, but fails· 
narrowly the inflation criterion, and very widely the fiscal deficit crite-
rion. Some comment on each of these is warranted. 
Interest rates in Malta have been rather stable over the years. This is 
because "monetary policy in Malta has been traditionally based on direct 
regulation ... using selective credit controls, administered interest rates 
and exchange cmitrols" (Demarco, 1999:35). In 1994 interest rates were 
liberalised and exchange controls were gradually lifted throughout the 
nineties. These developments have however hardly produced any move-
ments in domestic interest rates, due to the strong cushion of official 
foreign reserves that absorb the impact of adverse balance of payments 
movements. It may thus well be that Malta has never been submitted to 
the "market-test" of interest rates, involving the determination of an 
appropriate risk-premium on Maltese lira assets that correctly reflects 
the perceived threat of a devaluation. It may well be that these market 
considerations will have a stronger impact in future as exchange controls 
are further liberalised and the threat of capital outflows becomes more 
significant. Malta may in such circumstances well fail to qualify on the 
interest rate criterion, especially if the substantial fiscal deficit contin-
ues to fuel the demand for imports. 
The currency peg, and during the 1980s, price controls, have kept the 
inflation rate in Malta relatively low during the past decades. Still, the 
Maltese inflation rate currently narrowly fails to the meet the Maastricht 
convergence criterion mainly because of domestically-generated price 
pressures induced primarily by the expansionary fiscal stance. This 
consideration is of primary importance, since "among indicators of 
convergence, inflation had pride of place" (Dyson, 1994:345). Moreover, 
this situation could result in a further erosion of the country's competi-
tiveness in the international market-place, putting further pressure on 
the country's external imbalance. 
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The final criteria to be analysed regard Government finances. In the 
Maastricht Protocol, government is defined as "general government, that 
is central government, regional or local government and social security 
funds" (Treaty Article 104c(14) quoted in Patterson, 1997:4). Parastatal 
organizations are therefore excluded. In the case of Malta if one takes 
this definition of government debt the figure remains under the 60% 
limit, albeit fast approaching that benchmark. However, if one includes 
debt due by parastatal enterprises the figure increases to 92% ofGDP, for 
the year 1997. (European Commission, 1999). The main problem for 
Malta is however the budget deficit. "A major challenge is to put the 
budget on a sounder footing" (European Commission 1999, Section 2.1). 
· "Upon accession, Malta will be required to respect the 
stability and growth pact, to renounce any direct central 
bank financing of the public sector deficit and privileged 
access of public authorities to financial institutions and to 
have completed liberalisation of capital movements." 
(European Commission 1999, Section 3.6) 
Since 1986, the government fiscal deficit has tended to increase and in 
recent years has been well above the 3% limit (see Table 1) and has also 
caused other economic ills that compromise Malta's convergence with the 
EMU criteria. In view of these issues, Government has announced 
financial targets aimed at reducing its deficit to between 3% and 4% of 
GDP by 2004. The specific policies to be implemented have at this stage 
only been hinted at, but they would include increased taxation, more 
efficient revenue collection, improved efficiency in expenditure and 
privatisation. 
On the other hand, it is not enough that the Government achieves a 3% 
fiscal deficit to GDP target. By virtue of the Stability Pact, it is essential 
that this deficit ratio be sustainably maintained, as the "excessive 
deficit" criterion "will continue to apply to participating and non-partici-
patingcountries alike" (Patterson, 1997:3). Even though 'outs' cannot be 
fined for excessive deficits, the no-bail out clause and non-financing of 
deficits still apply. Furthermore, the 3% limit is "to be seen as an upper 
limit in normal circumstances" and national policies regarding govern-
ment budgets should "create room for manoeuvre in adapting to excep-
tional and cyclical disturbances" (quoted in Patterson, 1997:7). Hence, 
in normal economic circumstances the budget should be "close to balance 
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or surplus" (ibid.). The last year the Maltese government budget showed! 
a surplus was in 1981. ' 
The Maltese Economy and Real EMU Convergence 
During a "Seminar on the Accession Process" held on the 11 and 12' 
November 1999 in Helsinki it became more evident that nominal and real: 
convergence should be pursued in parallel, i.e. nominal convergence) 
(Maastricht criteria) should be accompanied by real convergence, that is I 
structural reform. Real convergence is analysed in terms of real GDPi 
growth rate, the unemployment rate and GDP per capita. This assess-! 
ment is typically carried out using the discomfort index as devised by l 
Arthur Okun and by the EMU indicator devised by Gros and Thygesen i 
(1992:468-4 71). . 
Table 2 presents data on unemployment, inflation, real GDP growth and 
the discomfort index for 1980-1999. The discomfort index shows the 
degree to which overall economic conditions are improving or deteriorat-
ing. 
In the period 1980-1999, the unemployment rate has always been below, 
the EU 1998 average of10.8%. However, this has in significant part been 
driven by public sector demand for labour, which may in future not be 
sustainable in view of the demands for the reduction in the fiscal deficit. 
In fact, the last three years have seen a slight increase in unemployment, 
as Government did not continue to generate new employment at the 
historical rates. The unemployment situation may even aggravate fur-
ther in the coming years as the economy restructures to become more 
efficient and the remaining protective measures for local industries are 
removed. 
According to Agenda 2000 (European Commission 1998), the EU antici-
pates that applicant countries maintain a 4% real GDP growth. Between 
1986 and 1996, growth in Malta is reported to have exceeded this figure 
- but significant doubt can be placed on the measurement of real GDP 
growth in the Maltese economy, which up to some years ago was based 
on 1973 deflators, and which may suffer from some conceptual deficien-
cies. In any case, growth was over the period significantly prodded up by 
an expansionary fiscal stance, whose maintenance over the coming years 
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is both unlikely and undesirable. In fact, economic growth slowed down 
perceptibly over the past four years when government started to rein in 
the rate of expansion of its deficit. 
Table 2 
Unemployment, Inflation and Real GDP Growth 
1980-1999 
Year Unemployment Inflation Real GDP Discomfort 
Rate Rate Growth Index 
1980 3.3 15.76 3.2 19.06 
1981 4.7 11.50 3.3 16.20 
1982 8.6 5.80 2.3 14.40 
1983 8.5 -0.87 0.8 7.63 
1984 8.6 -0.44 0.6 8.16 
1985 8.1 -0.24 1.8 7.86 
1986 6.9 2.00 4.0 8.90 
1987 4.4 0.42 4.2 4.82 
1988 4.0 0.95 5.4 4.95 
1989 3.7 0.86 5.5 4.56 
1990 3.8 2.98 6.0 6.78 
1991 3.6 2.54 4.4 6.14 
1992 4.0 1.64 4.5 5.64 
1993 4.5 4.14 5.7 8.64 
1994 4.1 4.13 5.8 8.23 
1995 3.7 3.98 6.2 7.68 
1996 4.4 2.49 3.8 6.69 
1997 5.0 3.27 3.7 8.27 
1998 5.2 2.40 3.1 7.43 
1999 5.3 2.13 3.1 7.43 
Source: Data for unemployment, inflation and real GDP growth from Central 
Bank of Malta Annual Reports 1980 to 1999. 
Table 2 also shows the discomfort index which is the summing up of the 
unemployment and inflation rates. The index has gone down from 19.06 
in 1980 to 4.56 in 1989 and gone up again to 7.43 in 1999. Taking Okun's 
interpretation, this indicates that over a time-period of nineteen years 
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i 
economic conditions have overall improved but in recent years there has;' 
been some deterioration. 
~ 
The EMU indicator assesses the overall economic performance of ~f 
country by adding up inflation, the budget deficit, public debt, unemployJ~ 
ment and the current account balance (Gros and Thygesen, 1992). ln1 
their analysis Gros and Thygesen gave figures for EU countries based on: 
1991 data. The Netherlands had the best rate at 11.6 while Greece had~ 
the worst at 51.8. For the year 1991, Malta's rate was calculated at 12.9.1: 
However, this indicator shot up to 32.13 in 1999. Although the indicator\ 
is "only suggestive ... .it is useful in discussing the need for convergence in~ 
individual member countries" (Gros and Tygesen, 1992:4 71). 1 
Conclusion 
This paper analyses the macroeconomic dimension of the Maltese economY! 
in the context of the ED's accession criteria, by considering nominal, as: 
postulated by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact,i 
and to some extent real convergence issues. 
It has been shown that the main difficulty encountered in Malta'sl 
1nacroeconomic situation at present relates to the excessive fiscal deficiti 
and a consequent lack of competitiveness. Malta qualifies for only two of: 
the nominal convergence criteria- and this position may not be sustain-! 
able if the country were to be further exposed to international capital' 
flows in the face of a substantial fiscal deficit. In terms of real conver-
gence, it has been shown that the need for the country to rectify its fiscal 
imbalance is gradually revealing the economy's true lack-lustre perform-
ance regarding economic growth and employment generation. 
These considerations highlight the need for far-reaching changes in the 
way in which the Maltese economy operates in order to compete within 
the globalised trading environment. The country needs a push to engage 
in am uch-needed indus trial restructuring programme and to rationalize 
better and more efficiently its operations. At this point in our history the 
prospect of EU membership seems to be the lever that is pushing us 
towards this. This need not necessarily be the issue since in any case the 
restructuring programme is inevitable in view of the globalisation 
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process currently taking place. Some reforms will carry deep social as 
well as economic impacts, and will need the support of all the social 
partners, so that welfare losses can be partially alleviated by sensible 
forward planning, and to ensure an optimum spread of the relative 
burdens. 
References 
ASSOCIATION FOR THE MONETARY UNION OF EUROPE (1998) 
Euro: What Happens Afterwards?: http//www .euro.infoline.intl.com. 
BEGG, D., GIAVAZZI, F., VON HAGEN, J. and WYPLOSZ, C. (1997) 
EMU: Getting the End-Game Right. London: Centre for Economic 
Policy Research. 
CABLE NEWS NETWORK INC. (1998) Let us Borrow, says Italy :http/ 
/www.cnn.com/dalema.pdf. 
CENTRAL BANK OF MALTA (1980-1998) Annual Report, (Various 
Issues) Malta: Gutenberg Ltd. 
CENTRAL BANK OF MALTA (1980-1999) Quarterly Review (Various 
Issues). Malta: Gutenberg Ltd. 
CENTRAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS (1980-1996) National Accounts 
for the Maltese Islands. Various issues for years. Malta. 
DEMARCO, A. (1990) "Monetary Policy for Malta in a Changing 
Financial Environment in Central Bank ofMalta", Quarterly Review, 
March 1990. Malta: Gutenberg Ltd. 
DUISENBERG, W.F. (1997) Monetary Policy in Europe: Quo Vadis? 
Brussels: European Monetary Institute. 
DYSON, K. ( 1994) Elusive Union: The Process ofEconomic and Monetary 
Union in Europe. London: Longman. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1998) Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and 
Wider Union: http//www.europa.eu.int.rview/en/agenda. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1999) "Enlarging the EU," Report Updat-
ing the Commission's Report on Malta's Application for Membership 
-COM 17 February 1999: http//www.europa.eu.int. 
FRANK, D. (1992) "The ECU and its Uses: How Business will adjust to 
a Single Currency," Special Report No. 256. London: The Economist 
Intelligence Unit. 
GRAHL, J. (1997) After Maastricht: A Guide to European Monetary 
Union. London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd. 
15 
Rose Marie Azzopardi 
GROS, D. and THYGESEN, N. (1992) European Monetary Integration: 
From the European Monetary System to European Monetary Union. 
London: Longman Group Ltd 
LAHMIDI, M. and PATTERSON, B. (1998) EMU and Cohesion- PE 
167.231:http//www.europarl/eu/int/euro/kufig/general/41en.pdf. 
PATTERSON, B. (1997) Stability and Growth: Brief Prepared for 
Research Division for Economic Affairs - PE 166.60: http// 
www.europarl.eu.int/euro/briefing/general.24.en.pdf. 
PELKMANS, J. (1997) European Integration: Methods and Economic 
Analysis. Essex: Addison Wesley Longman Ltd. 
PRINCETON ECONOMIC INSTITUTE (1997) EMU- Country Analy-
sis, Germany:http//www.pei-intl.com. 
SEIDEL, B. (1998) Does the Fulfilment of the Deficit Criteria Indicate a 
New Fiscal-Policy Discipline in Europe? Bonn: German Institute for 
Economic Research. 
16 
Sc 
sa 
co 
ap 
(C 
§ '] 
f 
c 
a 
*I 
si 
